Since that decision, US military and economic assistance has poured into Pakistan. Moreover, US sanctions imposed following the nuclear tests of 1998 and Musharraf's 1999 coup were waived so that the Taliban leadership and their Al Qaeda guests could be driven from Kabul. Simultaneously, US-Pakistan intelligence cooperation mushroomed, and led to the killing or capture of numerous Al Qaeda leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. At US prodding, Pakistan has also dramatically scaled back its support for militant groups operating in Indian-occupied Kashmir-a policy that had repeatedly pushed India and Pakistan to near war. But to great dismay, stability in Afghanistan and the destruction of Al Qaeda and Taliban networks in the region have not been achieved by renewed US-Pakistan cooperation.
Worse, the two groups have regrouped in the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands and increasingly work together. Boosted by funds earned from record opium crops, they are now threatening the fragile gains made by the US-led effort in Afghanistan. 6 Much of this can be attributed to Pakistan's failure since 9/11 to aggressively assert control over its territory and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries. 7 Seven years on and $11 billion (US tax dollars) later, senior Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders remain at large and are waging an increasingly dangerous insurgency in
Afghanistan that threatens the coherence of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO)
forces fighting there. 8 This situation has occurred because the Taliban and its affiliates have been able to reorganize inside Pakistan's remote and rugged FederallyAdministrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Not only has Pakistan failed to stop the terrorists, but many observers openly question Musharraf's commitment to the GWOT given the emphasis Pakistan placed early-on in hunting Al Qaeda (foreign fighters) as opposed to the Taliban. 9 Such a difference was clearly noted in frequent press reports of Taliban leaders openly moving about in parts of western Pakistan, and by the limited number of arrests or killings of their leaders. 10 With US-NATO efforts increasingly at risk as a result of a regrouped Taliban-and with that failure now starting to threaten Pakistan's stability as well-it is clear that the latest US-Pakistan relationship is not achieving desired US ends. Moreover, a string of senior security official visits to Pakistan since October 2007
is evidence of growing US concern over the expanding terrorist threat.
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Not surprisingly, doubts are rising (again) in Washington about the post-9/11 relationship with Pakistan and its reliability as a security partner. Much distrust, however, lingers on both sides resulting from the last period of strategic cooperation (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) and potentially, the US homeland. The new post-9/11 relationship was constructed to secure vital US security interests, but now, as common threats have expanded, offers both sides another chance to solidify a more normal and enduring relationship. The nature of the growing threat requires more than a one dimensional approach. US policy, while evolving, has been slow to realize this fact. This paper will posit that the mixed results achieved since 9/11 in the latest USPakistan (security) relationship were predictable, and are unlikely to improve (and could worsen) short of a radical restructuring of the entire relationship. This is due foremost to a long history of accumulated distrust between the two countries stemming from repeated breakups over policy differences. 12 The mutual distrust, which is structural in nature, is not well understood beyond serious observers of US-Pakistan relations. It is also a byproduct of two very different, almost alien, strategic cultures that have evolved from their unique national histories. What adds tension to the relationship is that these starkly different strategic cultures have produced national interests that are not adequately aligned (or reconciled), and are initially suppressed by both sides when the exigencies of the day compel the states to work together. 13 Later, as the relationship matures, the differences emerge, usually expressed by sharp disagreements over desired ends, or the perceived responsibilities of the other to adhere to promises. These irreconcilable differences then precipitate the breakup. 14 The breakup then leads to a period of mutual estrangement, only to be followed by a major geopolitical event that brings the two together. Then, the cycle starts anew. But as events force the two sides together, accumulated misgivings about the other side's reliability as a partner accompany the new partnership. 15 The result is manifested in subsequent policy failures as each side employs hedging strategies to match its misgivings about the other side. This is where the US finds itself today: needing Pakistan, but unsure of Pakistan's commitment. Pakistan, meanwhile, appreciates the renewed US attention and especially the largesse, but questions US staying power and whether it will be abandoned (again) to cope with the aftermath once the US departs or discards it. As such, Pakistan's willingness to fully cooperate in achieving US goals is conditioned by doubt that the US will remain to help Pakistan deal with the consequences of pursuing policies that may not be in its own best interests in terms of ensuring internal stability and security against external threats. US Senator Joseph Biden refers to this historical pattern of US-Pakistan relations as being "transactional", in that the relationship is based on US payment for services rendered, and nothing more. A relationship structured in such a manner, he argues, is not the norm for states with which the US seeks to have warm and enduring ties-and, he adds, the Pakistanis know it and perform accordingly. In response to mounting US criticism, senior Pakistan officials claim that the US has not supplied them with the proper equipment, spare parts, and other items required to effectively fight the well-armed militants, many of whom are foreigners and seasoned fighters. 37 Pakistani senior officials also argue that the US has failed to make good on the timely delivery of promised equipment, such as night-vision goggles (NVGs), usable attack helicopters (with sufficient spares), and aerial drones to enhance intelligence collection and targeting. Pakistani defense officials also criticize stringent US requirements to periodically inventory sensitive items, such as NVGs, which they claim denotes a lack of trust to properly use them. 38 The militants, Pakistani officials argue, are well-armed and mobile, and have the advantage of moving in familiar terrain among a supportive, neglected, and uneducated populace that has been bred to resist the government. 39 The FATA, Pakistani generals also note, has never been incorporated into the state structure, and to properly do so will take years and considerable sensitivity. They warn that frequent casualty-producing operations could destabilize the fighting its own war on terror, rather than the American war on terror. 43 For now, Musharraf remains in office. But with a coalition government that may seek his removal soon to take power, he is likely to find his energies devoted to his political survival, and not threats to regional stability. By any measure, his power will be diminished.
In It can thus be strongly argued that seven years after 9/11 forced the US and Pakistan back together, the new relationship has failed to secure desired US objectives or enhance overall stability in South Asia. Successes, though notable, have been limited and tactical in scope. As a result, post-9/11 security goals of defeating Al Qaeda, throwing out the Taliban, and rebuilding Afghanistan are now in jeopardy. And should stability in Pakistan unravel, the new US strategic relationship with India-a major jewel of the second Bush Administration-will also suffer. The US should also realize that Pakistan's military will remain a major decisionmaker in the country's foreseeable future, and that strong links to that institution must be maintained, regardless of whether its actions periodically upset us. The key benchmarks must be that the military works with us more than against us, and withdraws from politics. On the future of President Musharraf, the US should state (and demonstrate) that it supports the people of Pakistan and not specific individuals.
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State Department-led Foreign Assistance programs should expand on initiatives already underway to assist and develop institutions essential to a functioning democracy, such as an independent judiciary, better police, and for more democracy within political parties. Efforts to build a better press corps and train civil society organizations that monitor the government should also be continued, and expanded where possible. Expanding the capacity of democratic forces is also essential so that the military gains confidence in civilian governance. 57 In this area, the US must strenuously demand the immediate release of detained judges and lawyers, and the removal of limits on press freedoms Musharraf enacted to curtail opposition to his continued rule in 2007. (The new government will likely do so regardless, but it makes good US policy to say so.)
Equally important, the US should continue to stress the need for improved governance as a core component of its non-military assistance. A government that starts to perform in the delivery of services will fill a political void of popular unhappiness that the Army has traditionally exploited to intervene-as well as decrease the political space religious political parties have used to criticize the government and attract supporters. Urging Pakistan to expand political and economic freedom will also give the Pakistani people inspiration that the US shares their desire for a life with opportunities.
The United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) $750 million plan for infrastructure development that will build roads, health clinics, support girls education, and create a variety of micro and small credit enterprises in the FATA should be implemented as soon as possible. 58 Development is a key component of bringing the FATA under control, and by providing all but none-existent services to that remote area, support for the government can be expanded and recruitment of future terrorists reduced. In that vein, it is important to reiterate that opinion polls in Pakistan consistently rank the economy and the provision of basic services as far higher priorities than prosecuting the GWOT. And while support for Musharraf fades, support for Al Qaeda, its leader Osama bin Laden, and increased violence against the government is also fading. 59 The US must leverage these facts to support infrastructure development by expanding our interaction beyond security interests and a fixation on the military to partnering with capable political, civic, and social-humanitarian organizations to improve the lives of ordinary citizens by building local capacity. Such an approach already has precedent (and paid dividends), as nothing the US has done since 9/11 generated significant goodwill like the US military's humanitarian relief operations following the devastating 2005 earthquakes that killed 80,000 people. 60 In the face of polls that show little approval for US policies, we should strive to find creative ways of reaching directly support. 64 The US should accept the new Pakistan desire to take the lead, but firmly state that it will not tolerate the consolidation of a safe haven and will reserve the right to intervene if sufficient progress is not made, or if evidence of plans to attack the US or its allies emerge.
Finally, the long-term nature of the security challenge to the region must be fully appreciated in Washington, as no quick fixes are likely. The region must be seen as an integrated whole, and with that a new policy must emerge that views success in Afghanistan and Pakistan as intertwined and independently unachievable. To be successful in securing long-term political support in Washington, the new approach should forge a Cold War-like bond between the executive and legislative branches to sustain funding levels comparative to the allotments given annually to Israel and Egypt.
US policymakers must understand that they will have to pay the full price for peace and stability if they want it in South Asia. 65 Senior US officials must also understand that the Pakistanis, allied and dysfunctional, yet simultaneously clever and dangerous, have us cornered by virtue of their own miscalculated failures to defeat the terrorists on their soil before they regrouped. Promoting greater political and economic freedoms are essential, but in seeking a new relationship that leads to a stable, more responsible, terrorist-free Pakistan, the US must pay to play-and must do so with the cold understanding that immediate objectives may not be achieved. Moreover, Pakistan's pervasive culture of corruption may siphon or misdirect a fair share of assistance funds, or its leaders may unilaterally decide that the cost of US cooperation is not worth the cost. That decision, which Pakistan could make at any time, could lead it to choose other, less-demanding partners, such as Saudi Arabia or China, to meet its needs-or it could choose to play multiple sides in a way that limits the influence of US largesse.
What seems clear, however, is that staying the present course or disengaging is no longer possible in a post-9/11 world. Not only will NATO fail in Afghanistan if a terrorist sanctuary strengthens in the FATA, but Pakistan's own capacity to manufacture security problems-a trait manifested throughout its short turbulent history by repeated wars with India, support for jihadist groups, and nuclear proliferation activities all attest-will only continue. Just who, for example, is today receiving military training in the many unobserved camps spread along the Afghan border? 66 Add to that concerns about Pakistan's nuclear weapons, and one shudders at the consequences of an unstable, or unfriendly Pakistan. In the decade prior to 9/11, it was easily argued that Pakistan's problems constituted a significant hindrance to stability solely in South Asia. Pakistan's dysfunction did not overly concern US policymakers, though a nuclear exchange with India over Kashmir was a serious policy concern to prevent. The US willingness to repeatedly sanction and abandon engagement with Pakistan, however, makes the point that Pakistan and its legitimate security interests were never major priorities in Washington. But the US disengagement from Pakistan following the Afghan-Soviet war has had significant consequences and changed that calculus: foremost being a renewed Afghan civil war which led to the subsequent rise of the Taliban and the coming of Al Qaeda to South Asia. 71 What followed a decade later, orchestrated by those same individuals, were the 9/11 attacks. In addition, the Afghan-Soviet war deeply Smith, a former two-time US Army Attache to Pakistan, believes that a lack of trust by both sides in security matters is the key impediment to improving overall relations. 13 The idea of how different strategic cultures and interests have inhibited the development of a normal bilateral relationship is the theme of Dennis Kux's masterful book on the history of US-Pakistan relations, and why that relationship has repeatedly failed to produced satisfactory outcomes. Though written before 9/11, Kux's theme is that there is simply too little in common culturally for the US and Pakistan to ever have a truly productive relationship. See Dennis Kux, 24 Ibid. Karamat also noted that success can be achieved, but that it will take time (perhaps a decade) and considerable resources. 25 Sanger and Roche, sec. 1A, p. 1. See also Ackerman (Internet version [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . Both sources note that sustained economic growth is the underreported success story in Pakistan since 9/11. Economic growth has helped expand an emerging middle class, and a mass-felt desire for political stability. The challenge for Pakistan's leaders is to broaden the benefits of recent economic gains to reach more of the country's 160 million people. 31 Ibid. 37 Pakistani officials report that many of the fighters in the FATA are Uzbeks, Chechens, and Arabs. All are veteran fighters and have the benefit of fighting on terrain they know better than the Pakistan Army. General Zinni, speaking at Brookings, agreed, stating that even the US Army would be challenged to operate in the tribal areas, given the rugged terrain, limited roads, and the local inhabitants, who tend to exhibit a general hostility to outsiders. superb account of how the US interaction influenced South Asia since 1947. Overall, the author believes US involvement in South Asia has been more negative than positive. He recommends a more detached view, and the avoidance involvement in regional disputes, particularly those between India and Pakistan, or in supporting individuals over institutions. But, again, his approach was made pre-9/11. 68 Haqqani, Pakistan, Between Mosque and Military, 311-312. 69 Ibid, 326. Haqqani's concluding chapter is a must read for those interested in understanding the accumulated dysfunction of 60 years of US-Pakistan relations. 70 The author is not suggesting that the US is responsible for Pakistan's inability to consolidate democracy or build a stable polity. However, only the US, working closely with Pakistan for an extended period, is the most likely way Pakistan will be able to overcome its mounting instability and began to build a more enduring, inclusive, and stable democratic structure. This is a view shared by Pakistan experts, Husain Haqqani and Zaheed Husein, among others. 72 The claim that the US departed and left Pakistan to manage the fallout from the Afghan War, (what is now termed the "blowback") is a frequent criticism leveled against the US Government by senior Pakistani officials, as well as many US scholars. The author has heard the critique in harsh terms on many occasions, mostly from Pakistanis who remain bitter about the war's aftermath, but many senior US officials concur with the assessment. 73 The author first heard the phrase used while serving as an exchange student at the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College in 1995. The origin of the phrase is unknown, but the author has heard it uttered by senior US and Pakistan government officials on numerous occasions. Pakistanis refer to the "the three A's" as the only powers capable of saving the country. 74 General Zinni, for example, speaks repeatedly about how military ties, built-up over decades, have sustained a level of contact and affection between the two militaries independent of the politics of the day.
